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 Immigrants founded the United States of America.1 Religious 
oppression, taxation without representation, and other abuses by the 
Crown drove the Founding Fathers from mother England to the virgin 
shores of what would become America’s eastern seaboard.2  
 Over the years, people the world over have made their way to the 
United States.3 There exists a constant influx, both legal and illegal, of 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2007, North Central College. Thank you, Ali, for always 
providing love, support, and motivation. 
1 LEON F. BOUVIER, PEACEFUL INVASIONS: IMMIGRATION AND CHANGING 
AMERICA 13 (1992). 
2 See generally Campbell Gibson, The Contributions of Immigrants to the 
United States Population Growth: 1790–1970, 9 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 157  (1975). 
3 BOUVIER, supra note 1, at 13–26.  
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bodies across American borders.4 As of the year 2008, for example, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that 
approximately 12.6 million legal permanent residents called America 
home.5 Such a statistic is not very controversial: legal immigrants 
have every right to be in the United States under current legislat
Statistics about illegal immigrant populations are more striking. As of 
January 2009, the DHS claimed that nearly 10.8 million unauthorized 
immigrants had found their way into, and settled in, America.
ion. 
                                                
6  
 The battle against illegal immigration has traditionally taken place 
in the civil context, through deportation (now removal) hearings.7 
Those not legally present in the United States are removed. The power 
to exclude is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence.8 Over one 
hundred years ago, the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States held that “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident 
of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.”9 
This power, the Court went on, is “a part of the sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution.”10 
 
4 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf. 
5 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy 
Directorate, Estimates of Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008 1 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2008.pdf. 
6 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Policy 
Directorate, Estimates of Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United 
States: January 2009 1 (2010) [hereinafter DHS, Estimates of Unauthorized], 
available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf. 
7 Jennifer M Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 135, 135–36 (2009).  
8 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1899 
(2000).  
9 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1893). 
10 Id.; see also Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1899 n.58. Since Chae Chan Ping, 
the Supreme Court has addressed the power of exclusion on several occasions. The 
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 The more recent trend, however, is to control immigration through 
the use of the criminal justice system.11 The trend began in the 
1980s12 and continued in the 1990s.13 From 1996 to 2006, the num




                                                                                                                  
14 Using 2004 as an example of this burgeoning trend, the 
statistics speak volumes: United States magistrates and district court 
judges convicted approximately 31,000 non-citizens of immigration 
crimes.15 Since 2004, federal immigration prosecutions represent the 
largest category of federal criminal prosecutions at nearly 32% of the 
total.16 According to recent reports, the trend continues in spite of a 
new (perhaps significant to note, Democratic) presidential 
administration.17  
 This Note examines how prosecutors use discretion to prosecute 
immigrant-defendants in the Seventh Circuit under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1326(a)(2), (b)(1), and (b)(2). Under these sections of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act,18 reentry is a felony for previously 
deported aliens who have committed a combination of misdemeanors, 
or certain felonies, resulting in previous removal.19  
 
historical development of the power of exclusion is beyond the scope of this Note. 
For more, see generally Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1899–1905. 
11 Chacón, supra note 7, at 137.  
12 See generally Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a (2006); Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) 
(2006); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).  
13 See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130001(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (2006)).  
14 Chacón, supra note 7, at 139; see also TRAC, Graphical Highlights: DHS 
Criminal Enforcement Trends (2005), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhstrendsG.html.  
15 TRAC, Graphical Highlights: Offenses Differ by Court (2005), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsoffcourtG.html.  
16 Chacón, supra note 7, at 139 n.23.  
17 Id. at 139 n.24.  
18 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006).  
19 Id. at § 1326(b).  
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 A circuit split exists concerning the meaning of § 1326’s found-in 
language.20 When aliens illegally reenter the United States, they are 
violating § 1326. But, in order to prosecute them, the government must 
find them first. The circuit split revolves around the diligence that 
must be used by federal law enforcement and immigration authorities 
to discover § 1326 violators. Some circuits apply a constructive 
discovery standard: a § 1326 found-in violation is complete upon 
actual discovery or when federal authorities, through the use of 
reasonable diligence, could have known that the alien’s presence was 
illegal.21 Other circuits adhere strictly to an actual discovery standard: 
the completion of the crime is the exact date on which federal 
authorities discovered the alien’s presence.22  
 The Seventh Circuit is on the wrong side of the federal circuit 
split with respect to § 1326’s found-in language. Its application of an 
actual discovery standard fosters great potential for the abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion, as well as unwarranted sentencing disparities. 
These issues usually arise in two contexts: first, where illegal 
immigrants are convicted of state crimes after illegal reentry but 
before federal authorities learn of their presence. In this scenario, an 
alien may lose the opportunity to serve concurrent sentences due to 
untimely prosecution of the illegal reentry crime.23 Second, the statute 
of limitations may have tolled while the alien was serving his sentence 
in state custody; thus the period for prosecution has technically ended, 
but under an actual discovery standard, prosecutors are able to charge 
defendants outside of the statutory period.24  
                                                 
20 Compare United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that an alien is found when he is discovered by or, with reasonable 
diligence, could have been discovered by law enforcement) with United States v. 
Are, 498 F.3d 460, 466–67 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an alien is found only when 
actually discovered, regardless of diligence used). 
21 See, e.g., Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d at 282. 
22 See, e.g., Are, 498 F.3d at 466–67. 
23 See generally United States v. Lechuga-Ponce, 407 F.3d 895, 897–98 (7th 
Cir. 2005). 
24 See generally Are, 498 F.3d at 466–67. 
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 Additionally, sentencing across federal circuits, including the 
Seventh, is inconsistent.25 This is due to the limited availability of 
early disposition programs (also known as fast-track programs) in 
some federal districts that allow for expedited prosecution of 
immigration crimes.26 Even though Illinois ranks fifth among states 
for illegal immigrant population,27 the United States Attorneys’ offices
in districts in the Seventh Circuit have not put early disposition 
programs in place. As a result, a § 1326 defendant’s sentence could 
vary by not just months, but years, depending only on where the 
defendant is convicted because some judges allow downward 
departures
 
, and some do not.   
                                                
28 based on sentencing disparities 29
 Through an analysis of recent case law, this Note examines how 
and why courts in the Seventh Circuit continue to support the 
potentially abusive use of prosecutorial discretion as well as 
inconsistent sentences for § 1326 defendants. The cases United States 
v. Carrillo-Esparza,30 United States v. Villegas-Miranda,31 United 
States v. Medrano-Duran,32 Unites States v. Gordon,33 and United 
States v. Are,34 represent this circuit’s approach to § 1326.  
 The Seventh Circuit should change its approach in two ways. 
First, it should apply a constructive discovery standard to § 1326’s 
 
25 See Rebecca Schendel Norris, Note, Fast-Track Disparities in the Post-
Booker World: Re-Examining Illegal Reentry Sentencing Policies, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 747, 764–68 (2006). 
26 See id. 
27 See DHS, Estimates of Unauthorized, supra note 6, at 4, Table 4.  
28 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (8th ed. 2004) (“Downward departure. 
In the federal sentencing guidelines, a court’s imposition of a sentence more lenient 
than the standard guidelines propose, as when the court concludes that a criminal’s 
history is less serious than it appears”). 
29 See United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (N.D. Ill. 
2005).  
30 590 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 2010).  
31 579 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009).  
32 386 F. Supp. 2d 943. 
33 513 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2008). 
34 498 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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found-in language.35 This standard discourages untimely prosecution, 
and places the burden of conviction where it should be—on the 
government. This Note does not argue that prosecutors should reward 
aliens who are able to evade government detection. Those evading 
detection will not avoid prosecution simply by flying under the 
government’s radar. They are aided by a constructive discovery 
standard only to the extent that the government could have found 
them, but chose not to act and unfairly delayed prosecution. If 
prosecutors were diligent, but the alien was still able to avoid detection 
for the statute of limitations period, a conviction is still possible thanks 
to the fleeing-from-justice doctrine, which prevents tolling during 
episodes of active flight.36 
 Second, United States Attorneys’ offices located in districts in the 
Seventh Circuit should implement an early disposition program for 
§ 1326 prosecutions. Additionally, judges should grant downward 
departures to eliminate sentencing disparities among non-fast-track 
and fast-track district defendants. Doing so can harmonize sentencing 
of § 1326 defendants, so that the amount of time spent in prison is not 
left up to the fortuity of where a defendant is convicted.37 This 
solution serves both prosecutors and defenders: it provides for a 
unified discovery standard for a federal criminal statute and thereby 
fosters predictability; and it provides for more consistent sentencing in 
the Seventh Circuit while freeing up prosecutorial resources, which 
might increase conviction rates circuit-wide.  
 
I. STATUTE AT ISSUE: 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), (b)(1)–(2) 
 
 The statute at issue in this Note is the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.38 Specifically implicated is the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), 
which provides in pertinent part that “any alien who (1) has been 
                                                 
35 See United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1995). 
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2006). 
37 See United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, No. 08 CR 609, 2009 WL 310901, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2009). 
38 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006).  
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denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed . . . and thereafter 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United 
States . . . shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 
[two] years, or both.”39  
 Subsection (b) of § 1326 allows for heightened sentencing of 
certain categories of aliens, thereby removing them from the scope of 
criminal sanctions provided for in subsection (a). Those  
 
(1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, 
crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an 
aggravated felony) . . . shall be fined under title 18, 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; [and those] (2) 
whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of an aggravated felony . . . shall be fined under 
such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.40 
 
 For § 1326 violations, an indictment must be handed down 
“within five years next after such offense shall have been 
committed.”41 The five-year statute of limitations shall not be 
extended “except as otherwise expressly provided by law.”42 
 
II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT TREATMENT OF § 1326 
 
A. Found-in Language: The Seventh Circuit’s Use of the Actual  
 Discovery Standard 
 
 With respect to § 1326 prosecutions, the Seventh Circuit uses an 
actual discovery approach to cases of surreptitious entry and cases of 
                                                 
39 Id. at § 1326(a)(1)–(2). 
40 Id. at § 1326(b)(1)–(2).  
41 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).  
42 Id. For exception see 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2006) (statute-of-limitations 
protection does not extend to criminals fleeing from justice).  
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entry by way of official port or border station.43 Surreptitious entries 
are those where the alien crosses into the United States via some 
means of unofficial entry and goes undetected by federal authorities.44 
A defendant may argue that there is a significant difference between 
those who enter secretly and those who enter via an official port of 
entry.45 He may further assert that where an alien enters at an 
officially recognized port, the Government must be charged with 
constructive knowledge of the alien’s 46presence.   
                                                
 However, an alien is charged with a § 1326 violation because his 
presence is illegal, no matter how he achieved it. Thus, secret entry 
versus official port entry is an artificial distinction: a deportee who 
reenters the United States by presenting an invalid green card but uses 
his real name still deceives immigration officials as to the legality of 
his presence and has violated § 1326.47  
 
 1. A Note on Surreptitious Entry: United States v. Gordon 
 
 The Seventh Circuit clarified the artificial distinction that some 
defendants make between surreptitious entry and entry by way of an 
official entry port in United States v. Gordon.48 Defendant Gordon 
entered the United States in 1974.49 He was deported in 1990 after he 
was convicted on multiple charges of home invasion robberies.50 
Gordon returned to the United States in November of 1995 from 
Mexico at the San Ysidro, California, border checkpoint.51 At the 
 
43 See generally United States v. Gordon, 513 F.3d 659, 664–65 (7th Cir. 
2008).  
44 United States v. Acevedo, 229 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2000).  
45 Gordon, 513 F.3d at 663.  
46 Id.  
47 Acevedo, 229 F.3d at 355.  
48 513 F.3d at 660. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
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checkpoint, Gordon produced his invalid green card and was allowed 
entry.52  
 Gordon committed the crimes of home invasion and armed 
robbery in the year 2000 and was convicted of these crimes on August 
8, 2001.53 He entered Illinois Department of Corrections’ custody on 
August 10, 2001.54 
 An Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent 
interviewed Gordon on August 21, 2006.55 During the interview, 
Gordon admitted to having reentered the United States illegally by 
presenting his invalid green card at the San Ysidro border 
checkpoint.56 On May 9, 2006, he was indicted for a § 1326 found-in 
violation.57  
 Gordon moved to dismiss the indictment based on the tolling of 
the five-year statute of limitations.58 He argued that his entry was not 
surreptitious and therefore, the government should have known of his 
illegal presence in 1995.59 The court rejected Gordon’s argument. It 
noted that:  
 
Gordon entered through a recognized port by means of an 
authentic but invalid green card that concealed the illegality 
of his return to the United States . . . Accepting the district 
court’s finding that Gordon knew that his green card was 
invalid, Gordon’s presentation of that green card, combined 
with his non- disclosure of his prior deportation to the 
immigration officials at his reentry, does more than merely 
                                                 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 661.  
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
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suggest that his reentry into the United States was 
surreptitious.60  
 
 The court reasoned that charging immigration authorities with 
constructive knowledge of Gordon’s illegal presence would encourage 
aliens to “subtly fly under the government’s radar.”61 Once five years 
from their date of entry had passed, they would no longer be subject to 
§ 1326 prosecution.62  
 In the Seventh Circuit, logical extension of the actual discovery 
standard renders a distinction based on surreptitious versus official 
port entry irrelevant.63 Even if aliens enter at official ports and reveal 
their true identity and the illegality of their presence, they are still 
subject to prosecution under § 1326.64 This remains true even if the 
government fails to discover, for whatever reason, the alien’s illegal 
presence until a date substantially after the alien’s entry.65  
 
2. Galvanizing the Actual Discovery Standard: United States v.  
 Are 
 
 In United States v. Are, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) deported defendant Are in 1996 following a conviction 
for conspiracy to import heroin.66 Two years later, Are attempted to 
enter the United States through a New York airport.67 He was detained 
and immediately sent back to his home in Nigeria.68 Less than six 
months after his failed reentry in New York, Are slipped into the 
                                                 
60 Id. at 663–64. 
61 Id. at 664. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 665. 
64 Id. at 665–66. 
65 Id. at 665.  
66 498 F.3d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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United States.69 Are evaded immigration authorities until late 2003, 
when he was arrested in Chicago.70 The Chicago Police Department 
took a fingerprint sample from Are, which was sent to the Department 
of Homeland Security.71 On December 10, 2004, a Deputy United 
States Marshal completed a report on Are, which traced him to an 
address in the Chicago suburbs.72 Federal authorities arrested Are on 
June 20, 2005, and a grand jury indicted him for the offense of being 
found-in the United States on September 1, 2005, nearly seven years 
after his surreptitious reentry.73  
 “The district court dismissed the indictment as untimely under the 
five-year limitations period imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3282,” applying a 
“constructive knowledge standard” to determine when the statutory 
period had tolled on Are’s found-in offense.74 The court concluded 
that even though the indictment was issued less than two years after 
DHS learned of Are’s illegal presence, DHS had constructive 
knowledge of Are’s presence before September 1, 2000.75 The district 
court judge reasoned that federal immigration authorities should have 
known of Are’s presence before that date because they (at that time, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS) had started an 
investigative file on Are in 1998.76  
 The investigative file contained an Investigative Preliminary 
Worksheet on Are that indicated only Are’s name, his presumed 
location in Chicago, and a checked box that indicated that the case was 
“placed in progress.”77 A separate document in the file alluded to a 
confidential informant’s tip to the INS that Are was living in Chicago 









77 Id. at 463.  
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with his wife as of September 25, 1997.78 The district court found that 
two other documents existed that should have alerted federal 
authorities to Are’s presence prior to September 2000.79 The 
documents revealed that on December 21, 1998, the probation officer 
filed a Violation of Supervised Release form in the Eastern District of 
New York.80 Additionally, a December 29, 1998, arrest warrant was 
issued in connection with Are’s violation of supervised release.81 With 
the above information, the district court held that a diligent 
investigation would have led to Are’s discovery before September 1, 
2000.82 As a result, the indictment issued after that date was issued 
more than five years after the § 1326 offense was committed and was 
untimely.83 
 The Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s application of a 
constructive discovery standard.84 The Court held that an alien is 
found in the United States at the precise moment in time when federal 
authorities discover the illegal alien’s presence.85 The court reasoned 
that offenses are completed when each element has occurred.86 While 
it noted that “th[e Seventh] Circuit has yet to squarely address the 
issue of when the statute of limitations for a § 1326(a)(2) ‘found-in’ 
offense begins to run,” it did note that the found-in offense had already 
been characterized as a continuing offense in the Seventh Circuit.87  
 
In United States v. Lopez-Flores, we held that “in the case of 
surreptitious reentry . . . the ‘found-in’ offense is first 







84 See id. at 464–65. 
85 Id. at 464. 
86 Id. at 463 (citing Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970)). 
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committed at the time of the reentry and continues to the time 
when [the defendant] is arrested for the offense.” Treating the 
“found-in” version of  § 1326(a)(2) as a continuing offense 
“is a logical consequence of its language,” which punishes 
any deportee who “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time 
found in, the United States . . . The point of using a word such 
as ‘found’ in section § 1326(a)(2) is to avoid any need to 
prove where and when the alien entered; the offense follows 
the alien . . . [B]ecause the “found in” version of section § 
1326(a)(2) is a continuing offense, the date on which the 
immigration agency “should have discovered” the alien is 
simply irrelevant.88  
 
 The Are court reasoned that its interpretation “only makes sense 
given the straightforward language and manifest purpose of the 
statute.”89 However, the court failed to elaborate on what this manifest 
purpose is. The court instead compared § 1326 violations to other 
continuing offenses, such as conspiracy, escape, and failure to report 
to prison, where “the limitations period does not begin to run until 
some affirmative event puts an end to the defendant’s continuing 
criminal conduct.”90 
 The Are court thus galvanized the Seventh Circuit’s approach: the 
limitations period starts when the alien surrenders or is arrested by 
immigration authorities, not when authorities should have, or could 
have, known of the alien’s illegal status in the United States and his 
whereabouts.91 Of all federal circuits to address this issue, only the 
Fourth Circuit explicitly joins the Seventh Circuit in its approach.92 
                                                 
88 Id. (emphasis in original). 
89 Id. at 466.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See United States v. Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d 347, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2009). The 
First Circuit is leaning toward an actual discovery standard, but has not yet officially 
adopted it; see United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 52 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining to 
acknowledge the validity of an actual knowledge standard, but holding “more 
narrowly that for statute of limitations purposes in § 1326 prosecutions, there can be 
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B. § 1326 Sentencing in the Seventh Circuit 
 
 Sentencing issues in § 1326 prosecutions typically arise in two 
contexts. First, some § 1326 violators lose the opportunity to serve 
concurrent sentences.93 This situation typically arises where an alien 
illegally reenters the United States undetected by federal authorities 
and commits a state crime.94 The alien is sentenced, serves his time, 
and is indicted for a § 1326 violation close to, if not on the very day 
of, his release from state custody.95 In these circumstances, defendants 
argue for downward departures based on the lost opportunity to 
combine sentences.96  
 Second, federal circuits in which some districts use an early 
disposition program allow for downward departures for violators that 
comply with district guidelines.97 These departures are valid even 
though particular defendants may qualify for much higher sentences 
due to criminal history points.98 Sentences are generally longer in 
districts without an early disposition program for § 1326 defendants.99 
However, in some circuits, including the Seventh, sentencing judges 
are attempting to narrow the wide sentencing inconsistency gap by 
allowing downward departures based on what defendants would have 
                                                                                                                   
no finding of lack of diligence where it is deception by the alien as to his identity 
that has caused the government not to have knowledge of his presence”). United 
States v. Hoenes-De La Cruz, 114 F. App’x 524, 526 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
when an alien enters surreptitiously, he is found in the United States when actually 
discovered). The District of Columbia Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. 
93 See United States v. Lechuga-Ponce, 407 F.3d 895, 897–98 (7th Cir. 2005). 
94 See id. 
95 See generally United States v. Carrillo-Esparza, 590 F.3d 538, 540 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
96 Id.  
97 See Norris, supra note 25, at 751–53. 
98 Id.  
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been sentenced in a fast-track district.100 This practice is not 
consistently applied, however. As a result, some sentencing judges 
depart from the guidelines and some do not, subjecting defendants 
charged in the same circuit to arbitrary sentence disparities.101  
 
1. United States v. Villegas-Miranda 
 
 In United States v. Villegas-Miranda, the court indirectly 
addressed Villegas-Miranda’s argument that he deserved a downward 
departure of his § 1326 sentence because he had already served a 
prison sentence in state custody.102 Villegas-Miranda emigrated from 
Mexico to the United States in 1990 and quickly developed a criminal 
record.103 In June 2002, he was found, prosecuted under § 1326, and 
deported to Mexico.104 Villegas-Miranda reentered the United States 
without detection.105 On May 6, 2006, he was arrested for domestic 
battery and sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment.106 Villegas-
Miranda was supposed to be paroled from state custody on February 9, 
2007, but he was held on a federal immigration detainer until February 
12, 2007, when federal authorities charged him with illegal reentry 
pursuant to § 1326.107 
 Villegas-Miranda’s Sentencing Guidelines range was seventy-
seven to ninety-six months’ imprisonment.108 During his sentencing 
hearing, Villegas-Miranda argued that the district court should grant a 
                                                 
100 Id.  
101 Compare United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (E.D. 
Wis. 2005) (reducing defendant’s sentence below suggested Guidelines range) with 
United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, No. 08 CR 609, 2009 WL 310901, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 9, 2009) (refusing reduction based on fast-track disparities). 
102 579 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 2009). 
103 Id. at 800. 
104 Id.  
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downward departure of at least nine months.109 He argued that if the 
government had charged him with illegal reentry when he was arrested 
on May 6, 2006, or any reasonable time prior to his release from state 
custody, the district court would have been able to sentence his state 
and federal offenses concurrently.110 Since the government did not do 
so, he argued that he lost the opportunity to serve his state and federal 
sentences concurrently.111 The sentencing judge did not address his 
concurrent sentences argument and sentenced him to ninety months’ 
imprisonment.112  
 On appeal, the court vacated Villegas-Miranda’s sentence and 
remanded the case for re-sentencing; it ordered the district court to 
address his concurrent sentences argument.113 The court quickly 
focused its opinion. It noted that sentencing decisions themselves are 
reviewed for reasonableness, but procedures are reviewed under a non-
deferential standard.114 A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed 
reasonable, and typically, a sentencing court need not discuss each 
factor listed in the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3553(a).115 
The court only needs to articulate reasons for its sentencing decision 
and address all of a defendant’s principal arguments that “are not so 
weak as to not merit discussion.”116  
 The government argued that Villegas-Miranda’s concurrent 
sentences argument was so weak as to not merit discussion because it 
is not an argument of recognized legal merit and it lacked a factual 
basis.117 However, the court, siding with Villegas-Miranda, observed 
that “[s]everal circuits have recognized that a district court has the 





113 Id. at 804. 
114 Id. at 801.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 802 (citing United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 
2005)). 
117 Id. at 801.  
 547
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 8
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/8
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
authority to issue a below-Guidelines sentence based on the delay 
between the time federal immigration officials discovered that a 
defendant illegally reentered the United States and the time that the 
government charged him with illegal reentry.”118  
 The Villegas-Miranda court observed that the Seventh Circuit 
“has not definitively ruled on whether a district court may give a 
defendant a lesser sentence based on his opportunity to receive his 
federal time concurrent with his state time.”119 As Villegas-Miranda’s 
argument on appeal was a procedural one, the court took no position 
on its merits.120 Nevertheless, dicta points toward Villegas-Miranda’s 
argument for downward departures.  
 The court opined that the purpose of Sentencing Guidelines 
§ 5G1.3, which allows courts to impose federal and state sentences 
concurrently, is to prevent a defendant from serving duplicative 
sentences for the same criminal act.121 The government pointed out 
that in § 1326 cases, defendants are typically imprisoned in state court 
for offenses unrelated to their reentry prosecution.122 Thus, allowing 
defendants to serve concurrent sentences in these cases does not 
further congressional policy behind the Sentencing Guidelines.123 
Nevertheless, the Villegas-Miranda court remarked that “this idea has 
                                                 
118 Id. at 802; see United States v. Barrera-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533, 537 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that it was “permissible for a sentencing court to grant a 
downward departure to an illegal alien for all or part of time served in state custody 
from the time immigration authorities locate the defendant until he is taken into 
federal custody); accord United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 562 
(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Some courts allow downward departures but require some 
form of negligence or malfeasance on the prosecution’s part. See United States v. 
Los Santos, 283 F.3d 422, 428–29 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding downward departure 
permissible where defendant can show that delay in prosecution was in bad faith or 
longer than reasonable); see also United States v. Saldana, 109 F.3d 100, 104 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (careless or innocent delay that resulted in sentencing consequences so 
unusual and unfair that downward departure was warranted).  
119 Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d at 802. 
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not prevented our sister circuits from allowing sentencing courts to 
reduce a defendant’s sentence to credit him with state time served, nor 
does it directly conflict with the Guideline’s policy statement.”124 The 
court also stated that given its acceptance in sister circuits, a 
downward departure argument is reasonable and may be legally 
meritorious.125  
 
2. Recent Trend: Addressing Fast-Track Disparities: United 
 States v. Medrano-Duran 
 
 Recently, as evidenced by United States v. Medrano-Duran, 
sentencing judges have granted downward departures from Guidelines 
ranges due to the unwarranted disparity that arises among defendants 
in early disposition districts and those where fast-track programs are 
not yet available.126  
 Medrano-Duran came to the United States in 1997.127 From his 
arrival until 2004, he engaged in criminal activity, served time in Cook 
County Jail, and was ultimately deported in early 2004.128 In October 
2004, he was found in Mount Prospect, Illinois, and was arrested for 
illegal reentry.129 Medrano-Duran pleaded guilty in April 2005.130  
 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Medrano-Duran’s criminal 
history category of IV and his offense level of twenty-one (thanks in 
large part to his criminal past), qualified him for an advisory Guideline 
sentence of fifty-seven to seventy-one months.131 Medrano-Duran 
sought a downward departure from the advisory range by arguing that 
the unavailability in the Northern District of Illinois “of an early 
disposition or ‘fast track’ program for persons charged with illegal re-
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
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entry created an unwarranted sentencing disparity that the [c]ourt 
should take into account.”132 Medrano-Duran claimed that the 
existence of the sentencing disparity directly contravened Sentencing 
Guidelines § 3553(a)(6)’s guiding consideration for sentencing judges, 
which provides that a court is to consider “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”133  
 The government countered that the sentencing disparity could not 
be considered unwarranted because Congress had specifically 
approved the institution of fast-track programs at the Attorney 
General’s discretion.134 The court noted that in promulgating the 
Sentencing Guidelines, Congress placed no express restriction on the 
types of limitations that may be deemed unwarranted.135  
 Then, the court examined the sentencing ranges that Medrano-
Duran would be subject to in several fast-track districts.136 The 
Western District of Texas would offer a one-level downward departure 
that would reduce his range to fifty-one to sixty-three months.137 In 
the districts of New Mexico, Nebraska, and Idaho, the Southern 
District of Texas, and some divisions of the District of Arizona, he 
would be entitled to a two-level downward departure and a resulting




                                                
138 In other divisions in the 
District of Arizona, Medrano-Duran would be entitled to a three-level 
downward departure and a sentencing range of forty-one to fifty-one 
months.139 In the Eastern District of California and the District of 
North Dakota, he would receive a four-level downward departure 
a reduced range of thirty-seven to forty-six months.140 Finally, in
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 945 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7)).  
134 Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 946.  
135 Id. 
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most lenient fast-track districts, Medrano-Duran would be subject
thirty-month sentence.
 to a 
                                                
141  
 While the court did not question the prosecutor’s ability to use 
discretion when charging criminals, it did provide an example that 
showed the unwarranted disparities caused by the lack of a § 1326 
fast-track sentencing program: 
 
. . . [P]rosecutors were to determine as a matter of policy to 
handle all theft of government property cases under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 641 by permitting defendants to plead guilty to a statutory 
misdemeanor, thus capping their sentence at one year[;] a 
particular defendant who was similarly situated to the others 
but fortuitously was not offered such a bargain would have a 
strong claim that the resulting disparity was unwarranted. A 
similar fortuity exists in Medrano-Duran’s case. Medrano-
Duran is situated similarly to illegal re-entry defendants in, 
say, the Western District of Washington, but due to the 
fortuity of where he was found by the authorities after 
illegally returning to the United States, under the 
government’s argument he is or should be stuck with a 
Guideline-determined sentence. As other judges have stated, 
“it is difficult to imagine a disparity less warranted than one 
that depends on the judicial district where the defendant 
happens to be found.”142 
 
 The government also argued that Medrano-Duran was not 
similarly situated to fast-track defendants because he did not formally 
waive his right to appeal or file pretrial motions.143 However, the court 
rejected this argument: “it hardly makes sense to penalize Medrano-
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 947–48; see also United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 
958, 963 (E.D. Wis. 2005); United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 53 F. Supp. 2d 430, 
435 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
143 Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 948.  
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Duran for failing to meet the requirements of a program that was never 
available to him.”144  
 Lastly, the government argued that “giving a particular defendant 
like Medrano-Duran a lower sentence creates more disparity, not less, 
because it makes sentences differ among judges in a particular 
district.”145 While this may technically be true, the court found that the 
creation of disparity “depends on one’s frame of reference.”146 
Reducing Medrano-Duran’s sentence based on fast-track disparities 
reduces overall disparity when viewed on a national, and not just a 
district-wide, level.147  
 The court held that based on the above reasons, “the disparity 
between Medrano-Duran and illegal re-entry defendants in districts 
with early disposition programs was an unwarranted disparity among 
similarly situated defendants within the meanings of [Sentencing 
Guidelines] § 3553(a)(6).”148 As a result, the Court reduced his 
advisory Guideline range by three levels.149 Instead of fifty-seven to 
seventy-one months, Medrano-Duran now faced forty-one to fifty-one 
months.150  
 The Seventh Circuit’s approach to § 1326 is problematic in two 
ways. First, the its use of an actual discovery standard to determine the 
completion date of a § 1326 violation allows the government to 
unfairly delay prosecution. For violators covered under subsections 
(b)(1) and (2),151 this use of prosecutorial discretion can result in 
significantly increased time in prison due to a lost opportunity to serve 
concurrent sentences.152  







150 Id. at 949.  
151 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1)–(2).  
152 See United States v. Campbell, 667 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (E.D. Wis. 2009) 
(noting that “courts may, pursuant to their general sentencing discretion under 18 
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 Second, the Seventh Circuit’s approach to § 1326 sentencing 
results from the absence of an early disposition program to expedite 
convictions and standardize procedure for dealing with violators. Even 
though the Seventh Circuit is home to a significant population of 
illegal immigrants,153 United States Attorneys’ offices have failed to 
take advantage of fast-track programs available to them. As a result, 
§ 1326 violators are subject to a wide range of prison time based on 
where they are prosecuted and the sentencing judge’s willingness to 
depart from Sentencing Guidelines in order to comport with fast-track 
district sentencing patterns.154  
 The recent case United States v. Carrillo-Esparza155 is an 
example of the Seventh Circuit’s approach to sentencing. Typically, 
courts take a hard-line approach to sentencing § 1326 defendants.156 
But, in Carrillo-Esparza, the court left the door slightly ajar for § 1326 
defendants because its harsh denial of a downward departure was 
based on procedure and not substance.157 The Court did not dispel 
downward departures altogether. It merely placed the burden on 
defendants to raise all arguments in front of the sentencing judge.158  
 Without binding appellate direction to the contrary,159 a district 
court may have room to maneuver when sentencing § 1326 
                                                                                                                   
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), reduce a 
sentence so as to make it fully concurrent”); United States v. Jimenez-DeGarcia, 256 
F. App’x 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant was not entitled to 
sentence reduction even if government delayed his prosecution until after his state 
sentence). 
153 See DHS, Estimates of Unauthorized, supra note 6, at 4, Table 4. 
154 See generally United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 
(N.D. Ill. 2005).  
155 590 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 2010).  
156 See id. at 540–41 (refusing downward departure in spite of prosecutorial 
delay and concurrent sentences arguments).  
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, No. 08 CR 609, 2009 WL 310901, at 
*3  (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2009) (noting that neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Supreme 
Court has taken a specific stance on how to address inter-district sentencing 
disparities resulting from fast-track sentencing programs).  
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violators.160 They might refuse to adhere to strict sentencing 
guidelines and issue significant downward departures based on 
track sentencing disparities. United States v. Medrano-Duran is but 





                                                
161 It 
seems as though district judges will continue to use their discretio
when sentencing § 1326 violators. Judges have every right to do 
this;162 however, it is unfair to defendants since their sentence is solely
based on the judge before whom they ap
 
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOVERY STANDARD 
AND FAST-TRACK PROGRAMS 
 
 Of the eight federal circuits that have specifically addressed the 
issue, five have adopted a constructive discovery standard to apply in 
§ 1326 illegal reentry cases. The Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits hold, in one way or another, that for statute of 
limitations purposes, the offense of being found in the United States, 
in violation of § 1326, is not complete until immigration authorities 
both discover the illegal alien and know or, with the exercise of 
diligence typical of law enforcement authorities, could have 
discovered the illegality of the alien’s presence.163 
 
160 See, e.g. United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Wis. 
2005).  
161 386 F. Supp. 2d. 943 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
162 Norris, supra note 25, at 758–59.  
163 The Third Circuit’s approach includes shades of both an actual and a 
constructive discovery standard. See United States v. Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 541 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (noting that the government can be imputed with the knowledge of an 
alien’s presence when he enters at an official port, but also noting that where an alien 
enters and conceals his identity, the actual date of discovery will be used). The Sixth 
Circuit has yet to specifically adopt either standard, but it seems to be leaning toward 
the constructive discovery standard. See United States v. Dusevic, No. CRIM 05-
80410, 2005 WL 3133507, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005) (citing other circuits 
that have adopted the constructive knowledge test and finding that the government 
agents acted “with appropriate diligence, once they learned of [defendant's] presence 
in the United States”); see also United States v. Clarke, 312 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Bencomo-Castillo, 176 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999); United 
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A. Constructive Discovery Standard 
 
 The Second Circuit clearly outlined the constructive discovery 
standard in United States v. Rivera-Ventura.164 Rivera-Ventura 
illegally entered the United States via the San Ysidro, California 
border checkpoint in 1986.165 Shortly after entry, he was caught and 
deported by the INS.166 One year later, Rivera-Ventura again entered 
the United States illegally, this time near Brownsville, Texas, and once 
again, the INS caught him shortly after entry and commenced 
deportation proceedings.167 Rivera-Ventura moved to transfer venue 
from Texas to New York; his motion was granted.168 While he 
conceded that he was deportable, Rivera-Ventura requested an 
opportunity to apply for discretionary relief from deportation.169 He 
was released on bail pending this request and provided the INS with a 
false New York address.170  
 A letter informing Rivera-Ventura of his discretionary relief 
hearing schedule was sent to the false address.171He failed to show up 
for the hearing.172 The immigration judge ordered that the matter be 
                                                                                                                   
States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera-
Ventura, 72 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 
1994). The Ninth Circuit’s approach is not clear either. It stated that an alien is found 
when the appropriate government officials discover him, but it did not say whether 
discovery needs to be actual or constructive. United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 
F.3d 420, 422–23 (9th Cir. 1994). Later, though, the circuit cited approvingly to 
opinions that apply a constructive knowledge standard. See United States v. 
Hernandez, 189 F.3d 785, 789–90 (9th Cir. 1999). 
164 72 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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referred back to the INS for resolution.173 What the INS did to locate 
Rivera-Ventura is unclear.174  
 Between 1987 and 1994, Rivera-Ventura was arrested several 
times for driving while intoxicated.175 He escaped INS detection by 
giving a false name each time he was arrested.176 In September of 
2004, after notification of Rivera-Ventura’s incarceration for New 
York drunk driving charges, the INS finally re-arrested him.177 He was 
indicted under § 1326(a) for being found in the United States 
illegally.178  
 During trial, Rivera-Ventura argued that the five-year statute of 
limitations applicable to § 1326 violations barred his prosecution.179 
The district court disagreed and claimed that although he reentered in 
1987, the § 1326 violation was not complete for statute of limitations 
purposes until 1994, when the INS finally detained him.180  
 On appeal, the court addressed Rivera-Ventura’s argument that a 
§ 1326 found-in offense should not be treated as a continuing 
offense.181 The court noted that in the criminal context, statutes of 
limitations protect defendants from “having to defend themselves 
against charges supported by facts that are remote in time.”182 The 
Court remarked that according to Toussie v. United States, “criminal 
limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of 
repose.”183 The limitations period begins to run when the offense is 
184completed.   









181 Id.  
182 Id. at 281.  
183 Id. (citing Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970)).  
184 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.  
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 According to the Rivera-Ventura court, continuing offenses 
involve prolonged courses of conduct.185 The offense is not complete 
until the conduct has lapsed.186 The court continued its analysis of 
Toussie: 
 
The Toussie Court recognized the obvious “tension between 
the purpose of a statute of limitations and the continuing 
offense doctrine,” since the “latter . . . extends the statute 
beyond its stated term.” Noting that § 3282 states that the 
five-year limitations period provided therein, “should not be 
extended ‘except as otherwise provided by law,’” the 
[Toussie] Court concluded that a crime should not be 
construed as a continuing offense “unless the explicit 
language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a 
conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that 
Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a 
continuing one.”187  
 
 The court concluded that § 1326(a) found-in violations did not 
meet the standard articulated in Toussie.188 The court reasoned that 
found-in violations are somewhat complex because they involve the 
defendant’s conduct, as well as that of federal immigration 
authorities.189 The court articulated the constructive discovery 
standard with this context in mind: 
                                                
 
Thus, since the alien may be in the United States unlawfully 
after making a surreptitious border crossing that conceals his 
presence, . . . or after entering through a recognized port by 
means of specious documentation that conceals the illegality 
of his presence, . . . the offense of being “found in” the 
 
185 Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d at 281. 
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United States in violation of § 1326(a) is not complete until 
the authorities both discover the illegal alien in the United 
States, . . . and know, or with the exercise of diligence typical 
of law enforcement authorities could have discovered, the 
illegality of his presence.190  
 
 Ultimately, the court affirmed Rivera-Ventura’s conviction.191 It 
reasoned that even though, for statute of limitations purposes, the 
government could have been aware of his illegal presence in 1987, 
Rivera-Ventura knew his presence in the United States was illegal and 
thus, the steps he took to evade detection constituted fleeing from 
justice under 18 U.S.C. § 3290.192 Therefore, even though the 
limitations period had tolled, § 3290 allowed prosecution.193  
 
B. Fast-track/Early Disposition Programs 
 
 To date, thirteen districts use fast-track programs to expeditiously 
handle § 1326 illegal reentry prosecutions.194 Fast-track programs are 
possible thanks to prosecutorial discretion.195 Prosecutors may decide 
whom, what, when, where, and whether they will bring charges, as 
long as it is not done in an inherently discriminatory way.196  
 Exercising prosecutorial discretion results in a reduced caseload 
for each prosecutor.197 Thus, fast-track programs taking advantage of 
                                                 
190 Id. at 282. 
191 Id. at 285.  
192 Id. at 284.  
193 Id. 
194 Norris, supra note 25, at 757–58. 
195 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004) (“Prosecutorial 
discretion. A prosecutor’s power to choose from the options available in a criminal 
case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining, and 
recommending a sentence to the court”). 
196 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).  
197 See Implementing the Requirements of the PROTECT Act: Hearing Before 
the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Sept. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/Huff.pdf (testimony of Hon. Marilyn L. 
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prosecutorial discretion are particularly useful in instances where 
caseloads based on one crime are high.198 Those were the 
circumstances in the Southern District of California when the first fast-
track program was born.199 The District was inundated with illegal 
reentry cases, so the United States Attorneys’ office developed a way 
to process § 1326 cases more efficiently.200  
 With respect to § 1326 violations, two forms of early disposition 
programs exist. First, in districts employing charge-bargaining fast-
track programs, the prosecutor allows illegal reentry defendants who 
fall into the increased sentencing portion of § 1326 due to prior 
aggravated felony convictions to plead guilty under a different statute 
that carries a lower statutory maximum sentence.201 Defendants plead 
guilty to two counts of entry without inspection,202 which carries a 
maximum six-month sentence for the first offense and a two-year 
maximum sentence for the second offense.203 Sometimes, prosecutors 
allow defendants to plead guilty to one count of a § 1326(a) violation 
of simple illegal reentry, which carries a two-year statutory maximum 
sentence.204 Either way, the defendant’s interests are served because 
he receives a significantly reduced sentence in exchange for his 
cooperation with the prosecutor.205 Prosecutors can use charge-
                                                                                                                   
Huff, judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California) 
(“Historically, the fast-track was created by U.S. attorneys to address the issue of 
court congestion.”). 
198 Id.  
199 United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that, “[o]n July 22, 1993, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of California implemented the fast-track policy for immigration defendants 
charged with violating § 1326(b)”).  
200 Norris, supra note 25, at 751.  
201 Erin T. Middleton, Comment & Note, Fast-Track to Disparity: How 
Federal Sentencing Policies Along the Southwest Border are Undermining the 
Sentencing Guidelines and Violating Equal Protection, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 827, 
829–31 (2004).  
202 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006). 
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bargaining as an attractive incentive for guilty pleas, which allows 
courts to dispose of illegal reentry cases more quickly.206 
 The second option for a fast-track program was created in 
2003.207 In that year, Congress adopted the Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, kno
as the PROTECT Act.
wn 
d 
                                                
208 Section 401(m)(2)(B) of the Act instructe
the United States Sentencing Commission to adopt “a policy statement 
authorizing a downward departure of not more than [four] levels if the 
Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early 
disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the 
United States Attorney. . .”209  
 
 The Sentencing Commission followed Congress’ orders and 
promulgated the following policy statement in October of 2003:  
 
Early Disposition Programs (Policy Statement): 
Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart 
downward not more than [four] levels pursuant to an early 
disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of 
the United States and the United States Attorney for the 
district in which the court resides.210 
 
 Commonly known as downward-departure fast-track programs, 
defendants may receive a defense reduction of seven levels: four levels 
for the fast-track departure as authorized by the Guidelines; and three 
levels for acceptance of responsibility.211  
 
206 Id. 
207 Id.  
208 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003). 
209 Id. 
210 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 cmt. (2005).  
211 See Middleton, supra note 201, at 830; see also Sentencing Memorandum 
for Defendant at 3, United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (No. 04 CR 884) (July 13, 2005) (pointing out that in some districts, such as 
the District of Arizona, prosecutors reduce a defendant’s offense level an additional 
three levels for acceptance of responsibility).   
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 Then Attorney General John Ashcroft responded to Congress by 
issuing two memoranda to all federal prosecutors. The first 
memorandum addressed exceptions to what Ashcroft called a 
prosecutor’s “general duty to charge and pursue the most serious, 
readily provable offense in all federal prosecutions.”212 An exception 
is where the relevant district had implemented an early disposition 
program.213 The second memorandum outlined the requirements for 
implementation of a valid fast-track program, as well as the minimum 
requirements for fast-track plea agreements.214  
 Districts seeking to institute a fast-track program have to show the 
following: 
 
(1) the district either (i) confronts an exceptionally large 
number of a specific class of offenses within the district, and 
failure to handle such cases on an expedited basis would 
significantly strain prosecutorial and judicial resources in the 
district, or (ii) confronts some other exceptional local 
circumstance with respect to a specific class of cases that 
justifies expedited disposition of such cases; 
(2) state prosecution of such cases is either unavailable or 
unwarranted;  
(3) the specific class of cases are comprised of highly 
repetitive and substantially similar fact scenarios; and 
                                                 
212 Department of Justice, Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft 
Setting Forth Justice Department’s “Fast-Track” Policies, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 134 
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm 
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memo]. 
213 Id. 
214 Department of Justice, Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft 
Regarding Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or 
“Fast-Track” Prosecution Program in a District, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 134 (2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. 
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(4) the cases do not involve an offense designated by the 
Attorney General as a “crime of violence.”215 
 
 The following are the minimum requirements for fast-track plea 
agreements: 
 
(i) The defendant agrees to a factual basis that accurately 
reflects his or her offense conduct; 
(ii) The defendant agrees not to file any motions described in 
Rule 12(b)(3), Fed. R. Crim. P. [a.k.a. “pretrial motions”];  
(iii) The defendant agrees to waive appeal; and 
(iv) The defendant agrees to waive the opportunity to 
challenge his or her conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [a.k.a. 
“habeas petition”], except on the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.216 
 
 These requirements ensure that fast-track programs involve a 
give-and-take process. Prosecutors will reduce sentences in exchange 
for conduct on the part of defendants that typically speeds up 
prosecution and sentencing.217 
 
IV. A NOTE ON THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
 
 Before discussing a different approach to the Seventh Circuit’s 
§ 1326 prosecutions for illegal reentry, one more background issue 
must be developed. The United States Sentencing Guidelines, while no 
longer mandatory,218 provide guidance for judges. Moreover, the 
reasons for their adoption are still relevant, especially when departing 
                                                 
215United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Downward 
Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 15–16 (2003), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf. 
216 Norris, supra note 25, at 757 n.65.  
217 Id. at 750–51.  
218 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230–37 (2005).  
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from them can further the goals that Congress had in mind during their 
enactment.219  
 In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act.220 
Congress sought to achieve “honesty in sentencing” and to reduce 
“‘unjustifiably wide’ sentencing disparity,” which occurred even 
within the same district.221 For example, it was considered problematic 
that defendants sentenced in one district may be subject to widely 
inconsistent sentences based on which judge sentenced them.222  
 National sentencing disparity was also one of Congress’ 
concerns.223 However, differences based on sex, race, and region were 
the focus.224 Disparities caused by the fact that districts across the 
country experienced different criminal violations with varying 
frequency was not cause for concern.225 Congressional reports noted, 
though, that regional sentencing differences should not be ignored 
where similar criminal conduct is a joining factor.226  
 Under the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress created the United 
States Sentencing Commission and sought a federal criminal justice 
system that  
 
                                                 
219 See United States v. Carrillo-Esparza, 590 F.3d 538, 540–41 (7th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Villegas-Miranda 579 F.3d 798, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2009).  
220 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2019 (1987) (codified as amended in various 
sections of titles 18 and 28, United States Code).  
221 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).  
222 Symposium, The Effect of Region, Circuit, Caseload and Prosecutorial 
Policies on Disparity, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 166 (2003) (“A defendant 
sentenced to ten years in front of Judge Jones shouldn’t receive five years if he 
happens to get Judge Smith down the hall”); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 230–32 (1973) (criticizing pre-
Guideline sentencing).  
223 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (2006).  
224 Symposium, supra note 222, at 160.  
225 Id. at 171.  
226 Id.  
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(A) assure[d] the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set 
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; 
and 
(B) provide[d] certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes 
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to  permit individualized sentences when warranted 
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in 
the establishment of general sentencing practices . . .227  
 
 In creating the Guidelines, Congress directed the Sentencing 
Commission to consider “the community view of the gravity of the 
offense; . . . the public concern generated by the offense;  
. . . [and] the current incidence of the offense in the community and in 
the Nation as a whole.”228 In 1989, the Commission’s Guidelines 
became effective.229  
 Initially, the Guidelines were mandatory;230 sentencing judges had 
to adhere to them unless they could establish that a sentence outside of 
the guidelines was warranted under the framework established in Koon 
v. United States.231 However, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme 
                                                 
227 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).  
228 28 U.S.C. § 994(c).  
229 Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the Operation of the 
Guidelines System and Short Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of 
Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, 5 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 126 (1992).  
230 Id.  
231 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996) (judges were to consider four questions to determine 
if an out-of-guidelines sentence was proper: 
 1. What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’ 
  ‘heartland’ and make of it a special, or unusual, case? 
 2. Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those features? 
 3. If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those  
  features? 
 4. If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those  
  features?).  
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Court ruled that mandatory sentencing guidelines violated the 
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.232 Under a mandatory guidelines 
regime, sentencing judges considered facts often not tried in front of a 
jury when determining a defendant’s sentence.233 To remedy this 
constitutional violation, the Court held that the Guidelines were no 
longer mandatory.234 However, judges are not free to ignore the 
Guidelines; judges still must “. . . consider the Guidelines ‘sentencing 
range established for . . . the applicable category of offense 
committed.””235 
 The Booker Court strove to uphold as much of the Guidelines as 
constitutionally possible under its new non-mandatory sentencing 
regime.236 In so doing, the Court ratified Congressional purposes 
underlying the Sentencing Reform Act as well as those enunciated by 
the Sentencing Commission.237  
 
V. CHANGING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
 
 The Seventh Circuit should change its approach to § 1326 
violations. First, it should overrule Are and adopt a constructive 
discovery standard when analyzing a § 1326 found-in date for statute 
of limitations purposes. Additionally, an early disposition program 
should be instituted to reduce circuit-wide disparity of § 1326 
sentences. 
 
A. Adopting a Constructive Discovery Standard 
 
 Problems with the actual discovery standard used by the Seventh 
Circuit could be rectified by adopting a constructive discovery 
standard for § 1326 cases. 
                                                 
232 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230–37 (2005).  
233 Id.  
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 259–60 (emphasis added).  
236 Id. at 266.  
237 See id. at 238–41.  
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 United States Attorneys may have a wealth of information that, 
with reasonable diligence, would lead them to a § 1326 defendant, but 
under the actual discovery standard, they have no obligation to analyze 
the information in order to find a purported violator. The result is that, 
irrespective of statue of limitations issues, which will be addressed 
below, many prosecutions are pursued long after they could be 
sought.238  
 For those already incarcerated, this creates a high likelihood that 
they will spend significantly more time in jail due to a lost opportunity 
to serve concurrent sentences.239 The actual discovery standard 
encourages a prosecutor to delay prosecution, potentially knowing, or 
at least potentially having strong evidence to suggest, a defendant’s 
whereabouts.240 
 In contrast, the constructive discovery standard directly addresses 
this potential abuse by placing the burden of prosecuting § 1326 
violations where the Constitution mandates it to be put: on the 
prosecution.241 If a prosecutor has information that could, using 
reasonable diligence, lead her to the defendant, then she must pursue it 
or face the possibility that the statue of limitations will toll and she 
will not be able to seek the conviction. The public wants criminals 
brought to justice. While the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
discretion to decide whom to prosecute at what time, internal 
memoranda have supported seeking maximum convictions and 
sentences.242 Why, then, would prosecutors risk losing easy 
convictions under the guise of using this discretion? It is counter-
intuitive. Use of the constructive discovery standard supports 
                                                 
238 See generally United States v. Clarke, 312 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 1994). 
239 See United States v. Blount, No. 08-CR-263, 2010 WL 313739, at *4 (E.D. 
Wis. Jan. 20, 2010); accord United States v. Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 802–
03 (7th Cir. 2009).  
240 See generally United States v. Jimenez-DeGarcia, 256 F. App’x 830 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
241 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1943). 
242 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 212, at 2–4.  
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principles undergirding the criminal justice system, leads to obtainable 
convictions being carried through, and on top of that, protects 
defendants by bringing them to justice more quickly. As a result, 
should a judge deem it appropriate, a defendant may be able to serve 
concurrent sentences if charged for more than one crime.243  
 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has used language that suggests 
consideration of facts relevant in a constructive discovery standard 
analysis. United States v. Are244 is a clear example of this. In Are, the 
court sought to clarify the circuit’s stance on the constructive 
discovery standard by explaining the case of United States v. Herrera-
Ordones.245 In that case, the Seventh Circuit “rejected the defendant’s 
constructive knowledge argument as  a factual matter,” finding 
adequate evidence in the record establishing that the INS agents used 
adequate diligence “after learning of [Herrera-Ordones’s] presence in 
[the c]ounty [j]ail.”246  
 In terms of § 1326 prosecutions, the Seventh Circuit claims that 
the level of diligence used in the prosecution of defendants (at various 
levels) is simply irrelevant.247 However, it is puzzling why the Are and 
Herrera-Ordones courts, would even mention the level of diligence 
that INS agents used to investigate a defendant. The Are court went on 
to highlight the specific holding of Herrera-Ordones: that in cases 
dealing with challenges to venue, proper venue “may be laid wherever 
the alien is located in fact, and as often as he is located, whether or not 
better coordination and diligence would have alerted federal officials 
to his presence and status earlier and elsewhere.”248  
 However, the logic of the Herrera-Ordones holding should not be 
applied to cases that do not involve specific challenges to venue. The 
                                                 
243 See Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d at 803; see also United States v. Campbell, 
667 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997–1000 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (generally discussing concurrent 
sentencing where defendant was incarcerated in state custody before federal 
prosecution).  
244 498 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2007).  
245 190 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999).  
246 Are, 498 F.3d at 465 (emphasis added).  
247 Id. at 466. 
248 Id. at 465.  
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Seventh Circuit seems to blur this analytical distinction in its § 1326 
cases. If criminal prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations, it 
is immaterial whether venue is proper and whether the defendant is, in 
fact, guilty of the alleged conduct. The Herrera-Ordones holding is 
not problematic because it is precise.249 However, while the actual 
discovery standard is a bright-line rule, in application, it is arbitrary 
and unjustifiable. One wonders why courts would hold that 
immigration officials and federal law enforcement should not be 
required to exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting defendants. 
On the other hand, while the constructive discovery standard might be 
a more labor-intensive way for courts to analyze § 1326 cases, it is a 
fairer one. As long as prosecutors use diligence in seeking convictions, 
once the analysis has taken place, the case should be an easy win.250 
The issue here is not liability. It is procedural fairness.   
 Second, an actual discovery standard improperly extends the 
statute of limitations long past the prescribed period. Because a § 1326 
violation is a non-capital offense, the statute of limitations on 
prosecution is five years.251 Further, because it is relatively settled, at 
least in the Seventh Circuit, that the found-in offense here is a 
continuing offense, the statutory period will begin to toll upon the 
completion of the offense.252  
 Language used by the Seventh Circuit suggests that it is troubled 
by the prospect of § 1326 violators avoiding prosecution by avoiding 
detection for the statute of limitations period.253 As a result, the 
Seventh Circuit has inserted a continuing offense analysis into § 1326 
prosecutions.254 An alien who illegally reenters the United States 
prolongs his illegal presence each day he goes undetected, and thus the 
limitations clock does not toll during this period because the crime 
                                                 
249 See Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d at 513. 
250 The cases cited in this Note support this. They all are cases concerning 
sentencing; thus, liability has already been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
251 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006). 
252 Are, 498 F.3d at 466.  
253 See United States v. Gordon, 513 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 2008). 
254 Are, 498 F.3d at 464–66.  
 568
37
Mroczkowski: Improving the Seventh Circuit's Approach to Illegal Reentry Prose
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
technically has not ended.255 Using an actual discovery standard to 
address this problem is simply not necessary. 
 Congress has already addressed criminals fleeing from justice in 
18 U.S.C. § 3290.256 The statue provides that “[n]o statute of 
limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.”257 In 
§ 1326 found-in prosecutions, it would not be difficult for the 
government to meet this statute’s requirements through intentional 
flight to avoid prosecution. Often, aliens enter using false names or 
false documentation, and they have actual knowledge that their reentry 
is illegal.258 Further, sometimes aliens continue to use different false 
aliases once they regain entry into the United States.259  
 All possible factual scenarios that constitute fleeing from justice 
will not be laid out in this Note. However, the Supreme Court 
established long ago that fleeing from justice under § 3290 is a broad 
concept.260 Arguably, it would not be difficult for prosecutors to 
establish that § 1326 defendants were, at least for a time, fleeing from 
justice, and therefore the statute of limitations was not tolling. Use of 
an actual discovery standard to address illegal aliens avoiding 
detection is unnecessary and duplicitous. Courts need not create 
judicial solutions to practical problems where the legislature has 
already devised a solution.  
 As a result, where prosecution occurs more than five years after 
illegal reentry, it will not be time barred where the alien was fleeing 
from justice, whether law enforcement used reasonable diligence in 
                                                 
255 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).  
256 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2006).  
257 Id.  
258 See United States v. Herrera-Ordones, 190 F.3d 504, 506–07 (7th Cir. 
1999).   
259 See id. 
260 Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128, 133 (1895) (holding that “to 
constitute fleeing from justice, it is not necessary that the course of justice should 
have been put in operation by the presentment of an indictment by a grand jury, or 
by the filing of an information by the attorney for the government, or by the making 
of a complaint before a magistrate”; all that is needed is flight with the intention of 
avoiding prosecution); see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 266 (2010).  
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discovery or not. However, injustices arise under the actual discovery 
standard, where it cannot reasonably be said that a defendant is fleeing 
justice within the meaning of § 3290. For continuing offenses, the 
limitations period does not begin to run until an affirmative event puts 
an end to the defendant’s criminal conduct.261 The Are court clarified 
this rule:  
 
In conspiracies this is the date the defendant withdraws or is 
captured, and for escape and failure to report [to prison], it is 
the  date the defendant turns himself in or is caught. 
Applying a similar statute of limitations trigger to the § 
1326(a)(2) “found in” offense would start the limitations 
period when the alien  surrenders or is arrested.262  
 
 In Are, the court did not address this issue because both dates 
highlighting the end of criminal conduct offered by the government 
fell within the statute of limitations period.263 The factual elements 
required to establish the fleeing-from-justice state-of-mind 
requirement seem to be lacking where a defendant is already 
incarcerated.264 As a result, incarceration could be, and should be, 
viewed as an affirmative event putting the defendant’s conduct to an 
end. Defendants previously incarcerated argue for reduced sentences 
for their § 1326 violations.265 
 District courts in the Seventh Circuit are unsure how to treat the 
concurrent sentences reduction argument because the “circuit has not 
definitively ruled on whether a district court may give a defendant a 
                                                 
261 See United States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2006).  
262 United States v. Are, 498 F.3d 460, 466 (7th Cir. 2007).  
263 Id. at 467.  
264 It is arguable that a defendant does not have the power to flee while in jail, 
nor does he likely have the intent to attempt to do so.  Cf. United States v. Hewecker, 
70 F. 59, 60–61 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) (finding no intent to flee from justice where 
defendant was imprisoned abroad before untimely charge upon return to United 
States). 
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lesser sentence based on his lost opportunity to receive his federal time 
concurrent with his state time.”266 The governing actual discovery 
standard is inflexible and those wishing credit for prison time already 
served, where prosecution seems untimely, are not-ill received by 
judges, but are disposed of on procedural grounds.267 In Villegas-
Miranda, the court took no position on the merits of the defendant’s 
concurrent time reduction argument, but it held that it needed to be 
addressed during sentencing: 
 
Given that several circuit courts have held that a sentencing 
court can downward depart for [the loss of an opportunity to 
run federal and state sentences concurrently where federal 
prosecution seems untimely],268 and we have not explicitly 
ruled on it (and need not rule on it here), a defendant is 
reasonable to believe that it may succeed, and we find this 
argument to be legally meritorious.269 
 
 The language from Villegas-Miranda has been cited on the district 
court level to allow for concurrent time reductions.270 If this is not 
                                                 
266 United States v. Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2009).  
267 Sentencing courts do not have the power to back-date sentences. United 
States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944, 945–46 (7th Cir. 1996). However, under Booker, 
what courts have been doing is using the lost opportunity to serve concurrent 
sentences as a reduction-worthy fact in some cases.  
268 See United States v. Barrera-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Los Santos, 283 F.3d 422, 428–29 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Saldana, 
109 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1997). 
269 Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d at 803 (emphasis added); see also United States 
v. Lechuga-Ponce, 407 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument on appeal that he was entitled to concurrent time reduction because, 
although potentially meritorious, he did not raise it with the district court and it was 
thus not preserved for appeal). 
270 See United States v. Blount, No. 08-CR-263, 2010 WL 313739, at *4 (E.D. 
Wis. Jan. 20, 2010) (citing Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d at 802–03, for the 
proposition that “a district court may impose a lower sentence based on the lost 
opportunity to serve federal time concurrent with state time”). 
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what the Seventh Circuit wants Villegas-Miranda to stand for, it must 
clarify its position on this issue or face increased tension among 
district courts.  
 Given the intra-circuit tension that concurrent time reductions 
present, the Seventh Circuit or the DOJ needs to act. A clear holding— 
either abolishing the current policy, but more preferably recognizing 
the validity and policy of these reductions—is needed. Additionally, 
requiring a record to be sent to the DOJ when illegal aliens are 
convicted in state court would not be overly burdensome and, were the 
Seventh Circuit to adopt a constructive discovery standard, would 
arguably satisfy reasonable law enforcement diligence.271 Then, 
immigration authorities and the DOJ could conduct investigations that 
ultimately would lead to more § 1326 convictions. As this is consistent 
with federal criminal prosecutorial policy,272 one wonders why it has 
not been done. What federal law enforcement authorities do with 
information about suspected violators becomes part of the factual 
analysis of each § 1326 case under a constructive discovery standard. 
Where the government is diligent, as it should be, this will lead to a 
higher conviction rate. Where it is not, defendants will not be forced to 
suffer due to lackadaisical prosecution. This is precisely why statutes 
of limitations are in place.273 Defendants should not have to suffer due 
to slow law enforcement.  
 A constructive discovery standard protects the few defendants that 
would suffer from the abuse of prosecutorial discretion under an actual 
discovery standard. 18 U.S.C. § 3290 allows the government to 
prosecute beyond five years where the circumstances warrant it, as 
determined by Congress, not merely an Assistant United States 
                                                 
271 In fact, in some instances, it is actually practiced. See United States v. 
Jimenez-DeGarcia, 256 F. App’x 830 (7th Cir. 2007) (defendant was charged with 
state crimes and “[a]lthough Wisconsin promptly notified federal immigration 
officials of Jimenez-DeGarcia’s presence in the Badger State, he was not indicted on 
an illegal re-entry charge until sixteen months later,” and the government waited 
another eight months, until defendant finished serving his state sentence, to arraign 
him). 
272 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 212, at 2–4. 
273 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).  
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Attorney or ICE agent. Placing more of a burden on federal authorities 
to timely prosecute violators would protect those who are not fleeing 
justice and merely would seek the opportunity for defendants to serve 
concurrent sentences. A constructive discovery standard does not seek 
to overhaul § 1326 prosecutions. It merely seeks to align prosecutorial, 
defense, congressional, and judicial policies. It is not a best answer, 
but it is certainly a better one than merely using an arbitrary actual 
discovery standard.  
 
B. Adopting a Fast-track Program 
 
 Districts in the Seventh Circuit should implement early 
disposition programs to deal with § 1326 prosecutions. Doing so 
would reduce sentencing disparities within the circuit and would 
reduce disparities with other fast-track districts, as well as with circuits 
allowing downward departures based on sentencing disparities.  
 Under § 3553(a)(6) of the PROTECT Act, only unwarranted 
disparities are highlighted as cause for concern.274 Because Congress 
passed laws allowing the development of fast-track sentencing, it 
cannot be said that disparities resulting from these laws were those 
that Congress thought would be “unwarranted.”275 However, tension 
exists because Congress also enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, 
which specifically condemns unwarranted disparities.276 Moreover, 
the Booker Court noted that “Congress’ basic goal in passing t
Sentencing [Reform] Act was to move the sentencing system in the 
direction of increased uniformity.”
he 
                                                
277 Therefore, judges are left with 
(1) a general act of Congress that fosters disparity, (2) a specific act 
that tries to eliminate them, and (3) a Supreme Court case highlighting 
the policy of the disparity-reducing statute, yet allowing for discretion 
in sentencing. As a result, “whether fast-track disparities are  
 
274 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  
275 United States v. Sebastian, 436 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2006).  
276 See Norris, supra note 25 at 769–70. 
277 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005).  
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‘unwarranted’ or ‘unreasonable’ seems to depend on each judge’s 
personal sense of justice and fair play—hardly a uniform standard.”278  
 Until Congress acts again to completely harmonize § 1326 
prosecutions and sentences, courts are left to do as they see fit. The 
Seventh Circuit cannot solve this national problem, but intra-circuit 
sentencing is something that it can specifically address. With unclear 
guidance, some district courts have found that fast-track sentence 
disparities are unwarranted and have reduced § 1326 violators’ 
sentences accordingly, while some district courts have held the 
opposite.279  
 The Seventh Circuit seemed to address this issue in 2007. In 
United States v. Pacheco-Diaz, the defendant made a concurrent 
sentences reduction argument.280 He claimed that his sentence was 
unreasonable because the district court failed to consider sentence 
discrepancies existing among non-fast-track and fast-track § 1326 
cases.281 The court was not receptive. It held that a sentencing judge in 
a district without a fast-track program may not take into account the 
fact that similar defendants in fast-track districts could receive lower 
sentences.282 District courts have recognized and respected this 
holding, albeit sometimes begrudgingly.283  
                                                 
278 Norris, supra note 48 at 770.  
279 For example, compare United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 
958, 964 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (finding that “under Booker and § 3553(a)(6), it may be 
appropriate in some cases for courts to exercise their discretion to minimize the 
sentencing disparity that fast-track programs create,” then reducing defendant’s 
sentence) with United States v. Tellez-Boizo, No. 03 CR 54, 2006 WL 3392742, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2006) (holding that while disparity with fast-track districts was 
one reason in factual analysis for sentence reduction, it did not individually warrant 
reduction in present case). 
280 506 F.3d 545, 552 (7th Cir. 2007).  
281 Id.  
282 Id.  
283 See United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, No. 08 CR 609, 2009 WL 310901, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2009) (recognizing Seventh Circuit’s approach not allowing 
fast-track disparity reductions, but opining that “[t]his Court continues to believe, as 
a matter of policy, that it is unjust to permit sentencing disparities based on the 
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 The Seventh Circuit has very recently blurred its holding in 
Pacheco-Diaz. In United States v. Ramirez-Silva, the defendant, in 
spite of precedent to the contrary, argued that his § 1326(a) sentence 
was unreasonable due to wide discrepancies in potential jail time 
between Seventh Circuit defendants and those in fast-track districts.284 
On April 1, 2010, the court handed down its opinion. The court noted 
that unlike other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has not reevaluated its 
view of fast-track discrepancies in light of Kimbrough v. United 
States.285 Kimbrough was similar to Booker on a basic level. The 
Court held that the cocaine Guidelines, like the Sentencing Guidelines, 
were advisory, not mandatory, and that so holding did not create 
unwarranted sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack cocaine 
defendants.286 The Court held that the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities is but one factor that district courts must consider 
in determining a defendant’s sentence.287 
 In Kimbrough’s wake, it seems that a reasonable argument against 
unwarranted sentencing disparities must be considered if raised in 
§ 1326 cases. However, in Ramirez-Silva, the court did not address 
Kimbrough. The court cited Pacheco-Diaz and went on.288 
 The court’s failure to specifically address fast-track disparities in 
the wake of the Kimbrough opinion is even more confusing given the 
fact that shortly after recognizing that it had not addressed Kimbrough, 
                                                                                                                   
fortuity of the judicial district in which a defendant in an illegal reentry case is 
charged”). 
284 No. 09-3365, 2010 WL 1258239 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010).  
285 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
286 Id. at 107. 
287 Id. at 108. 
288 Ramirez-Silva, 2010 WL 1258239, at *3 (“We have not evaluated whether 
Kimbrough compels another look at the issue [of fast-track disparities], but other 
circuits have required defendants asking for a lower sentence on the basis of a 
purported fast-track ‘disparity’ to establish that they are similarly situated to 
defendants in districts with a program and, factually, would have been eligible for 
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the court laid out several ways in which Ramirez-Silva could have 
analogized his situation to defendants in fast-track districts:  
 
Ramirez-Silva stated at sentencing only that these programs 
exist in other districts, but he did not assert that he would 
have met the eligibility criteria for even one program of those 
which exist. Counsel failed to explain, for example, (1) the 
minimum eligibility thresholds set out by United States 
Attorneys' offices with approved fast-track programs, (2) 
whether the two months that Ramirez-Silva waited after his 
indictment before pleading guilty would have put him on a 
fast-track in any district, (3) whether fast-track defendants 
must waive their right to appeal,  (4) whether there are 
differences among fast-track districts as to the amount of 
sentencing consideration given, and (5) whether Ramirez-
Silva met any disqualifying criteria (such as his prior 
conviction for alien smuggling or his violation of supervised 
release).289 
 
 While the court ultimately rejected Ramirez-Silva’s fast-track 
disparity argument,290 one wonders whether it would have done so if 
he had addressed the court’s own criteria for analogizing to fast-track 
defendants. Even if the court still rejected his arguments, it probably 
would have had to address Kimbrough. Nevertheless, district courts in 
the Seventh Circuit are not in an enviable position. They are left with 
the holding from Pacheco-Diaz, other district courts’ disapproval of it, 
and a “test” listing ways in which a defendant can argue that he 
deserves a reduction based on fast-track disparities because he is 
similar to fast-track defendants and might be entitled to a reduced 
sentence in a fast-track district. What are defense counsel to do? It 
seems as though they should search all fast-track districts and find one 
where their defendant would be subject to a reduced sentence and 
argue the “test” from Ramirez-Silva until the Seventh Circuit revisits 
                                                 
289 Id. at *4. 
290 Id.  
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the Pacheco-Diaz holding and reconciles it with that of the very recent 
case of Ramirez-Silva.  
 On the other hand, if United States Attorneys in Seventh Circuit 
districts implement an early disposition program, this confusion would 
be remedied. Many, if not all districts in the Seventh Circuit would 
meet the executive branch’s fast-track criteria as outlined below:  
 
[Required Conditions for Implementation of an Early 
Disposition Program]291 
  
(1)(i) the district . . . confronts an exceptionally large number 
of a specific class of offenses within the district, and failure 
to handle such cases on an expedited basis would 
significantly  strain prosecutorial and judicial resources in the 
district . . .292  
 
 Illinois alone houses the fifth highest number of illegal 
immigrants in the United States.293 Implementing a fast-track 
sentencing program for illegal reentry offenses will allow for a more 
efficient use of resources in order to pursue more convictions.294 
Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the executive branch forces this 
criteria on fast-track-seeking districts. The Seventh Circuit has 
erroneously claimed that fast-track programs were designed solely for 
districts facing highly burdensome volumes of illegal reentry cases.295 
This is not the case, however. For example, early disposition programs 
were approved in the Districts of Oregon, Idaho, Nebraska, and North 
                                                 
291 The criteria outlined are taken from United States Sentencing Commission, 
Report to Congress, supra note 215, at 15–16. 
292 Id.  
293 See DHS, Estimates of Unauthorized, supra note 6, at 4.  
294 See Middleton, supra note 201, at 832–33 (discussing support for fast-track 
in Southwest States because the programs allow for more prosecutions using fewer 
resources). 
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Dakota.296 In these districts, each Assistant United States Attorney 
handles an average of two or three illegal reentry cases each year.297 
Further, an early disposition program was implemented in the Western 
District of Washington, where the rate of reentry cases per prosecutor 
per year is a measly 0.58 percent.298   
 
(1)(ii) [the district] confronts some other exceptional local 
circumstance with respect to a specific class of cases that 
justifies expedited disposition of such cases.299 
 
 This criterion is related to the first. The sheer population of illegal 
immigrants in the Seventh Circuit seems to militate in favor of arguing 
that this criterion be established. A high number of illegal immigrants 
means that a high number of federal immigration crimes are occurring 
daily.  
 
(2) state prosecution is either unavailable or unwarranted;300  
 
 This does not apply because the issue is federal immigration law 
and no similar state statute penalizes the same crime in this realm. 
 
(3) the specific class of cases are comprised highly repetitive 
and substantially similar fact scenarios301 
 
 The most relevant facts in § 1326 cases will be somewhat 
consistent time and again. A defendant will have illegally reentered 
the United States without permission from the Attorney General. 
                                                 
296 See United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (the court noted that these statistics were highlighted in the Government’s 
moving documents).  
297 Id.  
298 Id.  
299 See United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress, supra note 
215, at 15–16. 
300 Id.  
301 Id.  
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Justifications for reentry are not germane to criminal liability under 
this statute. Viewed at the most basic level, courts are concerned with 
a defendant’s legal status, when the defendant was apprehended by 
authorities, and whether the defendant had the Attorney General’s 
permission to reenter.  
 
(4) the cases do not involve an offense designated by the 
Attorney General as a “crime of violence.”302 
 
 According to the Attorney General, as listed in 28 C.F.R. § 28.2, 




 Compared to the actual discovery standard, the constructive 
discovery standard is a more sound approach to § 1326 found-in 
prosecutions. It places the burden of prosecution on the government, 
with whom it belongs in criminal cases.304 Furthermore, a constructive 
discovery standard might foster higher conviction rates. For the time 
being it is a win-win solution: defendants are brought to justice more 
swiftly, which allows for the possibility of serving concurrent 
sentences, resulting in less time spent in prison; for the government, a 
constructive discovery standard may yield more prosecutions and 
arguably more convictions because it places an onus on federal law 
enforcement to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing § 1326 
defendants.  
 Additionally, districts in the Seventh Circuit that implement early 
disposition programs for illegal reentry crimes may secure not only 
more convictions, but may secure them more quickly, which uses 
                                                 
302 Id. 
303 See Norris, supra note 25, at 757 n.64.  
304 See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1943). 
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fewer resources.305 Implementing early disposition programs will also 
take the pressure off of sentencing judges in the Seventh Circuit who 
are left with inconsistent appellate direction.306 
 The population of illegal immigrants in the United States has 
recently grown and may continue to do so in the foreseeable future.307 
Thus, immigration crimes will probably remain near the top of federal 
prosecutions, or at least remain stagnant, for years to come.308 In 
exchange for slightly reduced jail time, federal prosecutors in this 
circuit can expedite justice for those charged with illegal reentry and 
additionally, can charge more defendants. The chance to get a higher 
conviction rate seems to sound squarely with federal prosecutorial 
policy.309  
                                                 
305 See Middleton, supra note 202, at 832–33 (discussing support for fast-track 
in Southwest States because the programs allow for more prosecutions using fewer 
resources). 
306 See discussion of United States v. Ramirez-Silva, No. 09-3365, 2010 WL 
1258239 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) and United States v. Pacheco-Diaz, 506 F.3d 545 
(7th Cir. 2007) supra Part V.B. 
307 See DHS, Estimates of Unauthorized, supra note 6, at 2.  
308 Chacón, supra note 7, at 147.  
309 See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 212, at 2–4. 
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